












Building Winners? An Empirical Evaluation of Public 
















The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 
© by the author.  
 
 
   1 
Building Winners? An Empirical Evaluation of Public Business 





a and Martin Obschonka
b








This paper investigates economic and subjective effects of public business assistance delivered to 
nascent entrepreneurs in Germany. Employing cluster analysis, we explore the actual scope and 
intensity of business assistance used. Then we analyze predictors of take-up and perceived 
usefulness taking into account the different patterns of utilized assistance. Finally, we assess 
economic  effects  by studying subsequent business performance employing propensity score 
matching. We cannot reveal that business assistance translates into better start-up performance. 
However, we find that a lack of personal entrepreneurial resources predicts take-up of business 
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1. Introduction 
Publicly financed programs offering advice and training to nascent entrepreneurs are popular 
policy instruments across the globe. For example, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2008 
reports that 16% of the population in innovation-driven countries (aged 18-64) receives training 
in starting a business (Bosma et al., 2008). Support, in the form of specialized training and 
provision of information, advice, and various kinds of practical assistance, aims to assist 
“entrepreneurs to successfully develop their business activity and to respond effectively to the 
challenges of their business, social and physical environment” (European Commission, 2001, p. 
7; Lundström & Stevenson, 2005). In short, the nearly universally employed human-capital-
based approach to business assistance is designed to “build winners” rather than choose them. 
While the high volume of public expenditure for business assistance calls for rigorous evaluation 
of these assistance programs (European Commission, 2001; Gu et al., 2008),  empirical 
evaluations are sparse to date (Storey, 2000). 
In this paper, we evaluate business assistance schemes along two dimensions. First, from 
an economic perspective, publicly financed business assistance targeted at nascent entrepreneurs 
is justified by the positive external effects  accruing from entrepreneurship (Audretsch et al., 
2007; Storey, 2003).
1
Second, in addition to external effects, understanding how business assistance operates is 
a central aim of public-policy-related entrepreneurship research (Chrisman et al., 2005; Mole et 
al., 2009). Generally, business assistance is targeted at the individual nascent entrepreneur, who, 
in turn, should be able to transform this assistance into a tangible, or at least measurable, 
economic outcome. Understanding why one nascent entrepreneur perceives business assistance as 
 Social benefits arise when start-ups introduce innovation, increase variety, 
and spur competition, thus leading to increased productivity and economic growth (Fritsch, 
2008). However, many (potential) entrepreneurs lack the managerial and technical skills 
necessary for developing an organization (Shane, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2005).  Since 
entrepreneurial competence can be acquired—at least partly—through training and mentoring 
(Markman & Baron, 2003), one goal of publicly financed business assistance is to teach nascent 
entrepreneurs how to successfully launch a competitive and innovative venture. Therefore, the 
success of such policy must be judged on the basis of the positive external effects created by the 
assistance. 
                                                 
1 Additionally, a lack of recognition and asymmetric information are put forward as a rationale for publicly financed 
business assistance schemes (Storey, 2003). Founders ignore the private benefits of external advice and are thus 
usually averse to paying fees for any advice or training from outsiders. However, the argument of asymmetric 
information justifies only a one-off “taster” subsidy, and not general public provision of advisory services (Storey, 
2003). Moreover, business assistance schemes sometimes are implemented for sociopolitical reasons and thus aim to 
promote the economic status of disadvantaged groups (Reynolds, 2007). 
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efficacious, whereas another does not, could provide new information on the person-specific 
impact of business assistance. 
Studying both objective (economic) and subjective (personal) performance measures in 
entrepreneurial evaluation research is not a new idea (Storey, 2000), but a close look at the extant 
literature shows up  several shortcomings of this work. First, previous studies employing 
subjective assessments of business assistance have been mainly restricted to monitoring policy 
delivery (Storey, 2000). Second, prior research focuses mainly on the assessment of one 
particular scheme (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2005; Chrisman & McMullan, 2000; Chrisman, 1999; 
Wren & Storey, 2002), which limits the generalizability of the results given the diverse range of 
real-world business support schemes. Hence, evidence as to the actual use of business assistance 
is needed to discover the unit of investigation, i.e., the effects of a particular kind of business 
assistance. Finally, most evaluations fail to account sufficiently for selection bias (Storey, 2003). 
In view of these limitations of previous research, the aims of our study are the following. 
First, this study explores patterns of actual policy take-up. Our representative sample of start-ups 
allows us to take an aggregate view of business assistance schemes and characterize the scope 
and intensity of assistance along the founding process. Second, we analyze the predictors of 
policy take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance and thus seek to provide insights 
into both policy targeting and the person-related effects on the assisted entrepreneurs. Finally, 
this study aims to assess the economic impact of business assistance on subsequent business 
performance employing propensity score matching, which allows us to correct for selection bias. 
We find distinct patterns in the  use of business assistance, which emphasizes the 
importance and necessity of our investigation into this topic. Our results suggest that a lack of 
entrepreneurial resources (as indicated by a lack of human and social capital and a less distinct 
entrepreneurial personality make-up) makes people select into comprehensive business assistance 
and perceive such assistance as more useful. However, propensity score matching cannot reveal 
that the use of business assistance results in better start-up performance in terms of amount of 
initial capital, long-run employment, and credit rating. The findings further emphasize the need 
for interdisciplinary evaluations: even though business assistance does not seem to have an 
impact on a start-up’s long-run performance, it still might be useful to individual founders who 
lack personal entrepreneurial resources (such as entrepreneurial human and social capital or an 
entrepreneurial personality) in actually starting a business. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the range of business assistance 
schemes and previous evaluation studies. In Section 3, we set out our evaluation approach, which 
is designed to overcome the shortcomings of previous work. Empirical analyses are conducted in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of our results. 
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2. Public business assistance in the founding process 
2.1 Range of business assistance schemes 
Nearly every developed country provides subsidized business support to nascent and young 
entrepreneurs, as well as to small and medium-sized enterprises (Bosma et al., 2008). Large-scale 
initiatives of this type include the Small Business Development Center program in the United 
States (SBDC), the ALMI in Sweden (Hjalmarsson & Johansson, 2003; Storey, 2003), and the 
Business Links framework in the United Kingdom (Mole et al., 2008). Advisory services 
targeted at small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been in existence since the 1980s (Storey, 
2003), but it is only more recently that there has been a reorientation of these types of programs 
toward nascent and start-up entrepreneurs (Lundström & Stevenson, 2005). Moreover, business 
support schemes are increasingly targeted at very specific segments of entrepreneurship, for 
example, technology-oriented nascent entrepreneurs,  the unemployed, women or minorities 
(Reynolds, 2007).  This segmentation is accompanied by a great variety of public assistance 
services, which are mainly provided by (subsidized) private-sector consultants, colleges, and 
universities, as well as by chambers and industry associations (Storey, 2004; TMWTA, 2009).  
 
 
2.2 Previous evaluation studies 
To date, evidence regarding economic effects of assistance schemes has been ambiguous, leading 
Davidsson (2002) to conclude that many programs do not work. Various previous evaluation 
studies are summarized in Table 1, which also sets out several explanations for the equivocal 
results.
2
                                                 
2 Table 1 is based on a tabulation of studies on small business assistance programs in the United States done by Gu 
et al. (2008). For a more comprehensive overview of evaluations of U.S. schemes, the reader is directed to the 
original work. 
 First, previous analyses of business assistance schemes differ in their evaluation designs. 
In his examination of evaluation designs, Storey (2003) raises the criticism that policy initiatives 
in OECD countries are mainly monitored and thus lack rigorous evaluation. Therefore, Table 1 
summarizes evaluation studies by rigor of their analysis, with (a) experimental evidence ranking 
higher than (b) multivariate econometric studies that control for factors that affect the 
effectiveness of business assistance. This is not possible when conducting (c) mean comparisons 
or (d) monitoring business assistance merely by describing policy take-up. These methodological 
differences hamper the comparability across studies. Furthermore, less rigorous analyses cannot 
detect causal relationships. In particular, studies rarely control for self-selection (Storey, 2000, 
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2003), even though self-selection into consulting is highly plausible (Chrisman & McMullan, 
2000). Without controlling for self-selection of founders with promising (less promising) 
ventures into assistance schemes, evaluations will overestimate (underestimate) their impact. 
Second,  the analyzed assistance is very diverse in intensity and scope, covering 
everything from intense strategically-oriented counseling to less intensive operational advice. In 
addition, the various providers of business assistance, which also encompass a wide range, from 
university-based initiatives and venture capitalists to the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, 
do not only target nascent entrepreneurs but also young entrepreneurs and owner-managers of 
small enterprises. Third, the impact of assistance schemes in prior work is usually measured by 
various outcome variables ranging from subjective measures of recipients’ satisfaction to 
objective measures of subsequent business performance such as sales, employment, or survival 
(McMullan et al., 2001). The use of different outcome measures can be partly attributed to 
policymakers, who usually do not specify measurable objectives of assistance schemes (Storey, 
2003). Finally, institutional setting could be important, thus hampering the generalizability of 
findings from policy evaluations conducted in Europe, Latin America, and the United States. 
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Study  Analyzed scheme/unit 
of analysis  Data  Control for 
selection bias  Treatment variable  Performance 
measure/outcome  Covariates/controls  Findings 


























FINCA Peru—a “village 
banking” organization 
for poor, female 
microentrepreneurs in 
Lima and Ayacucho  
Baseline survey few 
weeks prior to the training 
in 2002 and 2003; follow-






-  Random 
assignment into 
either mandatory or 
voluntary 
assistance or no 
treatment at all 
-  Assistance 
included general 




-  Weekly to bi-
weekly training 
-  Institutional outcomes 
(e.g., repayment rates of 
micro credits) 
-  Business skills and 
practices 
-  Business outcomes 
-  Household outcomes, 
including empowerment 





-  Location 
-  Type of treatment 
(mandatory vs. voluntary) 
-  Ex-ante attitude toward 
training 
-  Education 
-  Civil status 
-  Business size 
 
Both clients and microfinance 
institutions profit from 
concomitant business 
assistance: the microfinance 
institution benefits from 
increased retention and 
repayment, and the clients 
showed greater business 
knowledge and better business 
outcomes. Interestingly, the 
effect was strongest for those 
clients who expressed the least 
interest in the training at the 
very beginning. 























assistance to start-ups 
Start-ups that received 
venture capital and that 
were identified in the 
Venture Capital Journal; 
mainly high-tech firms; 
N=205 
No  -  Business 
management 
advice (strategic) 
-  Operational 
assistance 
Venture teams’ perceived 
usefulness 
-  Industry experience 
-  Team tenure 
-  Innovativeness 
-  Engagement of venture 
capitalists 
-  Year of first-round funding 
Business management advice 
and operational assistance is 
assessed worse the more 
industry experience the new 
venture team has. Business 
management advice is more 
welcome when start-up teams’ 
primary experience is from 
another industry. Current firm 
performance is not related to 
new venture teams’ evaluation 



























assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Survey conducted in 
2001; receipt of SBDC 
counseling was 5–9 years 
prior thereto, N=159 
No  Varying degrees of 
time spent in direct 
contact with SBDC 
counselor within 
nascent phase 
-  Employment 
-  Sales 
-  Founder’s prior 
experience 
-  Founder’s education 
-  Scope of target market 
-  Firm age 
-  Industry 
Positive relationship between 
time spent in guided 
preparation and sales and 

























services to small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises  
Telephone survey of 
2,000 firms, around half 
of which had received 
intensive assistance from 
BL between April and 
October 2003 
No  Intensive assistance 
by BL 
-  Employment growth 
-  Sales growth 
-  Firm size 
-  Firm age 
-  Legal form 
-  Market characteristics 
-  Business strategy 
-  Age of owner-manager 
-  Previous self-employment 
Intensive assistance from the 
Business Link network seems 
to have a positive effect on 
simultaneous employment 
growth (no significant effect on 
sales growth). 
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Study  Analyzed scheme/unit 
of analysis  Data  Control for 
selection bias  Treatment variable  Performance 



























Random sample of 
nascent entrepreneurs in 
the U.S.; different 
schemes of business 
assistance—either 
government sponsored 
or funded by 
universities/business 
associations 
Panel Study on 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED); interviews in 
1998/1999; follow-up 












-  Separate dummy 








Status of founding process: 
being still nascent 
entrepreneur vs. having 
started venture vs. having 
quit 
 
-  Durable good 
-  High-tech start-ups 
-  Marital status 
-  Gender 
-  Being homemaker 
-  Industry 
Participation in business 
assistance programs does not 
appear to significantly affect 
outcomes even when 
controlling for awareness of 
programs. However, separate 
analysis of different providers 
of assistance reveals impact of 
business assistance on turning 
nascent entrepreneurs into 
actual entrepreneurs 






















  Venture capital 
assistance to German 
start-ups 
German start-ups that 
received venture capital in 
2002; N=106 
No  Management support 
by venture capitalists 
-  Absolute EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization) 
-  Earnings growth 
-  Subjective assessment of 
goal achievement 
-  Subjective attribution of 
management support on 
firm performance 
-  Subjective evaluation of 
quality of management 
support 
-  Characteristics of founder 
team 
-  Company age 
-  Company size 
 
Quality of management support 
is positively related to 
EBITDA and the subjective 























within the U.K. 
Enterprise Initiative that 
aimed to provide SMEs 
with a marketing 
strategy; the program 
ran from 1988 to 1994 
All eligible small and 
medium-sized enterprises 
in the West and East 
Midland of England, the 
South West of England, 
and South Wales; survey 








-  Sales turnover 
-  Employment 
-  Survival of SMEs 
-  Prior turnover 
-  Prior employment 
-  Independency of firm 
-  Export orientation 
-  Industry 
-  Region 
 
Counseling impacts on sales 
turnover, employment, and 
survival. However, the 
program is most effective for 
medium-sized companies. No 
impact on survival measure 
could be found for smaller 
firms as a group. 






























assistance to small 
businesses 
Small business clients 
from SBDC in 
1985/1986; N=76 
No  Receipt of 12 or more 







-  Sales growth 
-  Subjective assessment of 
financial performance 
Control for potential 
moderating effect of the 
clients’ type of business 
In the short run, small business 
clients benefit more from 
administrative and operating 
assistance, suggesting a short-
run impact on reducing costs.  
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Study  Analyzed scheme/unit 
of analysis  Data  Control for 
selection bias  Treatment variable  Performance 




















assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Clients from SBDC in 
1992; mail questionnaire 
in 1994; N=2,025 
No  Receipt of five or 
more hours of SBDC 
counseling 
Start-up of venture one 
year after SBDC assistance 
measured by either 
-  having become an 
organization, 
-  having hired employees, 
or 
-  having made sales 
Analysis of subsamples in 
order to identify regional 
effects 
Nascent entrepreneurs who 
take up SBDC program are 

































assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Clients from SBDC in 
1992 and 1994; follow-up 
surveys one year later; 
those founders were 
contacted in 1997 who 
responded to first follow-
up survey and who had 
indicated that they had 
successfully started a 
firm; N=169 
No  Receipt of five or 
more hours of SBDC 
counseling 
-  Survival 
-  Employment growth 
-  Sales growth 
-  Innovativeness 
-  Perceived usefulness 
Not applicable  Start-ups that took up the 
SBDC program show higher 
rates of survival, growth, and 
innovation than what an 
average population of ventures 
would suggest. In retrospect, 
the vast majority perceives the 






















assistance to nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Clients from SBDC in 
1985 and 1986; survey in 
1987; 36.8% of 
respondents did not start 
business; N=123 
No  Receipt of 12 or more 





Clients’ perception of the 
value of SBDC assistance 
Analysis of subsamples in 
order to determine if the 
relationship between the 
perceived value and the kind 
of assistance was moderated 
by the consultant, the client, 
and the venture 
Strategic assistance (but neither 
operating nor administrative 
assistance) is positively 
associated with the perceived 

















provided within EXIST, 
a federal German 





telephone survey in 
2002/2003; N = 196 
No  Analysis of scope and 
intensity of actual 
business assistance  
Perceived usefulness of 
business assistance 
Not applicable  52.9% of respondents made use 
of some kind of business 
assistance in the firm formation 
process. Three different 
patterns of policy take-up can 
be observed, with assistance 
differing in scope and intensity. 
Overall perceived usefulness of 
business assistance is high 
(51% of respondents perceive 
its usefulness as high; only 
16% indicate a low usefulness). 
Table 1: Previous evaluation studies of (partly publicly financed) business assistance given to (nascent) entrepreneurs as well as owner-managers of SMEs 
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3. Evaluation approach 
Our evaluation is designed to overcome the shortcomings of previous research by, first, 
exploring patterns of actual policy take-up (Section 3.1), second, investigating predictors of 
take-up and perceived usefulness (Section 3.2) and, third, examining the assistance’s impact 
on subsequent business performance (Section 3.3). 
 
3.1 Exploring actual policy take-up 
As shown in Table 1, previous evaluation studies either  employed a program-oriented 
approach (by focusing on one particular policy scheme) or modeled the treatment as a binary 
variable (business assistance yes/no). These  strategies, however, hardly reflect  the “real” 
world, where a great many programs exist simultaneously (see, e.g., Gu et al. (2008) for an 
overview of US programs or Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2008) for 
services in Germany).  
Independent of particular schemes, business assistance can be categorized as either 
operational or strategic support (Hjalmarsson & Johansson, 2003; Barney et al., 1996; 
Chrisman & Leslie, 1989). Operational services are objective and encompass known 
knowledge among experts; strategic advice is more individually oriented and is developed 
interactively between consultants and clients (Hjalmarsson & Johansson, 2003). Then, 
information previously unthought-of emerges whose communicability is limited. Strategic 
assistance can be thus expected to be more time-intensive (Chrisman & Leslie, 1989). 
Although most advisory services are designed for particular groups, the scope and intensity of 
assistance actually provided can be expected to be strongly determined by self-selection of 
founders. In particular, Hjalmarsson and Johansson (2003) argue that strategic services are 
developed in a symmetric relation between clients and consultants. The use of strategic 
services implies a strong commitment on the part of the founder, considering that a certain 
amount of effort (and time) will be needed to choose the appropriate advisor and convey 
enough information to make the service selected worthwhile. 
Given the different and partly complimentary services, nascent founders may take up a 
mix of different schemes and even utilize different patterns of business assistance within 
single assistance schemes (Kulicke, 2004).
3
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, we lack information about the take-up of individual schemes which change a lot over time. 
 We thus argue that an exploration of the kinds of 
treatment delivered to a person as a whole is necessary to discover the real unit of evaluation. 
Following earlier research on characteristics of public business assistance (Kulicke, 2004), we 
explore patterns in scope and intensity of a person’s utilized business assistance (irrespective 
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of the use of particular schemes).  These  patterns  of actual policy take-up  then serve as 
reference points for the effect assessment. 
 
3.2 Take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance 
Having explored the actual unit of investigation, we are interested in the determinants of 
individual policy take-up and founder’s perceived usefulness of business assistance. This 
information will provide deeper insights into the effects of business assistance (McMullan et 
al., 2001) since it is comprised of the personal judgment of the most central actor in both the 
business assistance process and the firm formation process, that is, the entrepreneur. Nascent 
entrepreneurs self-select into business assistance schemes and make decisions about the scope 
and intensity of services they use (Chrisman & McMullan, 2000), whereas program selection 
effects should be considered to be relatively weak when policymakers pursue a strategy of 
“building winners” (Kösters, 2009).  In the following, we argue that a founder’s personal 
entrepreneurial resources as well as characteristics of the start-up project are crucial in 





Personal entrepreneurial resources 
It is expected that differences in business assistance take-up, as well as in perceived 
usefulness, are a function of founders’ personal entrepreneurial resources. Those nascent 
founders who lack the necessary resources needed for entrepreneurship should thus select 
themselves into (specific) business assistance and should perceive this as more useful. This 
situation can be described as the “weakness hypothesis”  and is based on Markman and 
Baron’s (2003) person-entrepreneurship-fit framework and psychological control theory (e.g., 
Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). 
  Markman and Baron (2003) argue that entrepreneurs who lack important resources 
(e.g., human and social capital, entrepreneurial skills and ability, self-efficacy) have a poor 
person-entrepreneurship fit and are thus more likely to be unsuccessful in their entrepreneurial 
activity.
  In our case, nascent entrepreneurs with low resources might not only exhibit a poor 
fit, but might also perceive their weakness, motivating them to seek help and value this help. 
It seems plausible to assume that the combination of entrepreneurial tasks (which are in 
general  demanding, complex, and stressful  (Schindehutte et al., 2006)) and low  personal 
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entrepreneurial resources might lead to excessive demand and a sense of loss of control 
among these founders. According to control theory, however, individuals seek to exert control 
over their environment (e.g., Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995), and thus we posit that “weak 
founders” might expend a certain amount of effort to restore their sense of control, for 
example, by taking up business assistance.
5
  Specifically, we argue that those founders who lack human and social capital as well 
as an entrepreneurial personality structure will utilize business assistance more often than 
other founders and perceive the same to be more useful. First, a high level of human capital 
has been shown to be related to firm survival and growth (Brüderl et al., 1992) and thus can 
be viewed as an entrepreneurial resource (Markman & Baron, 2003). Brüderl et al. (1992) 
argue that knowledge gained in prior self-employment indicates entrepreneur-specific human 
capital as it might be the best preparation for the entrepreneurial role. Entrepreneurial 
experience (i.e., previous self-employment) might thus enable entrepreneurs to draw upon 
routines that have worked well in the past and thus lower their need for external business 
assistance (see Cooper et al., 1995).
 
6
  According to Markman and Baron (2003), social capital is also an entrepreneurial 
resource since it proxies other resources that can be made available through social networks 
and contacts. For example, higher entrepreneurial performance might be achieved through 
better access to entrepreneurial finance, and since social ties provide a mechanism by which 
investors obtain information, social ties may facilitate venture capital funding (Shane & 
Cable, 2002). Consequently, a person’s social capital is positively associated with both 
discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities and the ability to actually take advantage of them 
(Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Jack & Anderson, 2002). Since nascent entrepreneurs with a rich 
 Furthermore, novice entrepreneurs might benefit most 
from business assistance since the acquisition of entrepreneurial and managerial skills might 
compensate for a lack of experience (Ucbasaran et al., 2009). Parental self-employment can 
be considered as another measure of entrepreneur-specific human capital (Brüderl et al., 
1992) as self-employed parents have been shown to serve as both role models and resource 
providers (Parker & Belghitar, 2006; Davidsson & Honig, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                                         
4  Perceived usefulness is a central evaluation outcome in past evaluation research (McMullan et al., 2001; 
Storey, 2000). 
5 Such a challenge-response perspective on human cognition and behavior figures prominently in psychology 
and sociology (e.g., in coping theories such as the transactional stress theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) or 
Elder’s concept of control cycles (Elder & Caspi, 1990)) and it has been applied to various fields of human 
behavior in critical transitions or context-situations such as rapid social change (Pinquart & Silbereisen, 2004) or 
critical life transitions (Heckhausen et al., 2001). 
6 However, Cooper et al. (1995) find that the greater search activity of novice entrepreneurs includes only 
personal sources, not professional sources. 
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endowment of social capital have been shown to access resources through their personal 
network, endowments of social capital might lower the need for public business assistance. 
Finally, personality traits should also predict take-up and perceived usefulness as past 
research makes clear that entrepreneurial activity and success are related to an individual’s 
personality (see Rauch & Frese (2007) for a recent meta-analysis). In other words, an 
entrepreneurial personality is itself an entrepreneurial resource. This should hold true for both 
specific traits (e.g., need for achievement, self-efficacy, and risk-taking) and broad traits (e.g., 
the Big Five; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Although broad traits reflect only a person’s very basic 
personality, they have been shown to be relevant predictors within the study of 
entrepreneurship (Rauch & Frese, 2007; Zhao &  Seibert, 2006). Schmitt-Rodermund 
(2004,2007) could show that the individual similarity to a reference type of an entrepreneurial 
personality profile (i.e., high in extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness and low in 
agreeableness and neuroticism) relates to entrepreneurship (individual entrepreneurial 
characteristics, activity, and success)  (see also Obschonka  et al.,  in press).  Such an 
operationalization of personality is based on the so-called person-oriented approach 
(Magnusson, 1998), which has received widespread attention in psychology, but has to date 
been neglected by entrepreneurship researchers. A person’s entrepreneurial personality may 
not be adequately characterized by single traits alone, but by their configuration. Applying 
Schmitt-Rodermund’s definition of an entrepreneurial personality, we thus expect that 
founders without an entrepreneurial personality profile, which is characterized by high scores 
in extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness and low scores in agreeableness and 
neuroticism, utilize business assistance more often and, furthermore, perceive this assistance 
as more useful than do founders having a more entrepreneurial set of personality traits. 
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Characteristics of the start-up 
In addition to the personal characteristics of the nascent entrepreneur, characteristics of the 
start-up may also affect the take-up and perceived usefulness of business assistance. On the 
one hand, team start-ups should be less in need of business assistance because their internal 
resources are more substantial to begin with, consisting of an accumulation of all team 
members’ human and social capital (Kamm et al., 1990; Lechler, 2001). On the other hand, 
having more than one person involved in the founding process has the potential to lead to 
conflict and advice, in the form of a business assistance program, might be sought due to a 
“need for decision legitimation” (Cooper et al., 1995, p. 113). 
  Furthermore, Cooper et al. (1995) find that the need for preparation and legitimacy 
leads to an increased search for information and increased use of professional assistance. For 
example, start-up ventures having a high degree of novelty are generally more complex due 
to, e.g., uncertain markets and regulatory requirements and thus innovative ventures are 
expected to be accompanied by intensive search activities. Highly educated founders of 
innovative start-ups or academic spin-offs face high opportunity costs in the form of either 
foregone earnings in wage employment or time that could have been spent advancing their 
academic reputation (Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003).  Business assistance might then  be 
helpful in allowing these nascent entrepreneurs to rationalize their entrepreneurial 
engagement (Holland, 1997). 
Supply-side factors also shape the pattern of policy take-up. The increased policy 
focus on entrepreneurship led to an increased availability of subsidized business assistance 
over time. Particularly, there is an extensive range of business support for academic spin-offs, 
beginning with the EXIST initiative in 1998 (Audretsch & Beckmann, 2007). Moreover, there 
may be some evidence of policy induced selectivity toward the “weak” founders (i.e., those 
with few entrepreneurial resources), visible, for example, in schemes targeted at women, 
minorities, the young, and the unemployed (Lundström & Stevenson, 2005). 
 
Table 2 summarizes our hypothesized directions of how founders’ personal characteristics and 
the properties of the start-up will affect the take-up and perceived usefulness of business 
assistance. The table makes clear why we focus on entrepreneurship-specific human capital, 
such as self-employed parents, since other human capital variables can be expected to be 
highly correlated with the novelty of the business idea or being an academic spin-off. 
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  Take-up and perceived usefulness 
of business assistance 
Characteristics 
of the founder 
Human capital 
Previous self-employment  ─  Parents self-employed 
Social capital  ─ 
Entrepreneurial personality profile  ─ 
 
Characteristics 
of the start-up 
Team start-up  ? 
Novelty / Academic spin-off  + 
Table 2: Hypothesized directions of how characteristics of the person and the start-up affect take-up and 
perceived usefulness of business assistance 
 
 
3.3 Economic effectiveness 
Public provision or subsidization of business assistance is mainly justified by the expectation 
of positive external effects accruing from better start-up performance of assisted founders or 
by sociopolitical reasons like the advancement of certain groups, e.g., women, minorities or 
immigrants (Reynolds, 2007). Following the rationale of positive external effects, public 
advisory services are effective if they improve start-ups’ economic viability so that assisted 
start-ups do, indeed, result in positive external effects in the long-run. Assistance provided 
during the nascent phase has the potential to create long-term benefits (Chrisman & 
McMullan, 2000) because initial founding conditions and decisions at the pre-start-up stage 
have been found to leave a long-term impact on subsequent structure (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
and performance (Bamford et al., 2000; Cooper et al., 1994). However, external effects 
accruing from individual entrepreneurial activity are very difficult to measure since they 
include fuzzy indirect effects such as introduction of innovations and securing market 
efficiency through competition (Fritsch, 2008). Furthermore, positive external effects only 
become apparent in the long run, with estimated time lags between entrepreneurial activity 
and subsequent economic performance of up to 10 years (Fritsch & Mueller, 2004; Thurik et 
al., 2008; van Stel & Suddle, 2007). 
Therefore, a venture’s capital base, its employment, and long-term survival are often 
used as proxies for positive external effects in empirical studies (e.g., Chrisman & McMullan, 
2000; Chrisman et al., 2005). These measures of success indicate start-ups’ economic 
viability, their knowledge base, and resource strength, which are seen as   necessary 




                                                 
7 However, success measures such as survival or growth can only roughly indicate social returns because even 
failed start-ups may give rise to positive externalities. A failed start-up may have challenged incumbents and 
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 The data 
This  paper  draws from rich new data collected within the Thuringian Founder Study 
(Thüringer Gründer Studie),  a project that examines technology-oriented and knowledge 
based entrepreneurship in the Federal State of Thuringia, Germany. For the time of our 
analysis (1994-2006) business assistance schemes targeted at nascent entrepreneurs have been 




nation-wide analysis would  thus have to cope with different institutional backgrounds. 
However, the range of business assistance schemes across Germany can be considered as 
similar, since regional initiatives have been often sponsored within federal programs. For 
instance, within the national EXIST program, a network of universities, business incubators, 
and the Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Get-up / Thüringer Gründer Netzwerk) was 
established in 1998, which concentrates its business assistance on founders of technology-
oriented and knowledge-based start-ups (TMWAI, 2003). Moreover, the focus on one 
German state made it possible to conduct face-to-face interviews raising data quality.  
Sample 
The database draws from the commercial register for commercial and private companies 
(Handelsregister, Abteilung A/B) in Thuringia and includes 2,971 start-ups in innovative 
industries registered between 1994 and 2006. Innovative industries, according to ZEW 
classification (Grupp & Legler, 2000), comprise “advanced technology” and “technology-
oriented services”. 
The survey population consists of 4,215 founders (first registered owner-managers) 
who registered a new entry in the Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. This design made 
it possible not only to interview founders of active companies but also founders of ventures 
that failed. From the survey population we selected a random sample of 3,671 founders to 
contact. Due to team start-ups, this corresponds to 2,604 start-ups in innovative industries. 
Between January and October 2008, we conducted 639 face-to-face interviews with solo 
entrepreneurs or with one member of a start-up team (a response rate of about 25%). Due to a 
                                                                                                                                                         
given rise to knowledge externalities, e.g., when the ideas and experiences of their former employees become an 
integral part of products made by successful firms (Audretsch et al., 2007; Fritsch, 2008). 
8 The wide range of initiatives with diverse funding institutions has led to a shift in policy. Beginning in 2007, 
the federal level is solely responsible for business assistance to start-ups that are younger than five business 
years. Business assistance targeted at nascent entrepreneurs is now the responsibility of the Länder authorities 
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number of exclusions,
9 the present analysis includes 445 start-ups, all founded later than 1993 
so as to preclude any effects of German Reunification
10. The structured interviews were 
conducted by members of the research project as well as by student research assistants who 
were trained in several sessions during December 2007. On average, an interview took one 
and a half hours. The interviews covered a broad set of questions regarding sociodemographic 
and psychological data of the founder. Moreover, we asked for founder’s activities along the 
founding process. Retrospective data relating to events in the founder’s life and  business 
history were collected using guided recall. Specifically, we utilized mnemonic techniques 
drawn from the Life History Calendar method (Caspi et al., 1996). This method has been 
shown to collect more valid and reliable retrospective information than traditional 
questionnaires (Belli et al., 2004) and has been successfully employed in retrospective studies 





43.6% of founders took-up business assistance along the founding process, which has been 
defined as the time between the first steps in the start-up project and the first business year. 
Founders were asked to specify whether they made use of business assistance in regard to 
formalities, the business plan, financing, a market analysis, or management support. 
Furthermore, inquiry was made as to the intensity of business assistance used. Definitions of 
the variables can be found in Table 3. 
                                                                                                                                                         
(Bundesregierung, 2008). However, this new structure of funding business assistance schemes is not the subject 
of this paper. 
9 Seventy-three start-ups that turned out not to be genuinely new (e.g., they were a new branch or new business 
area of an existing company) were removed. A further 18 interviews were deleted due to concerns over interview 
quality. One-hundred start-ups were founded before 1994. Because of refusals for several variables, the number 
of observations changes across the analyses. 
10 We defined the first business year as the time when accounting started either because of legal obligations or 
because of first revenue. This does not necessarily correspond to the date of registration in Handelsregister. 
11 We employed a study-specific version of the Life History Calendar, which is a data-collection tool developed 
by psychologists and sociologists. It is based on the principles of autobiographic memory. This means that—in a 
first step—we asked interviewees to fill in the timing of well-known life events, sequences, and transitions (e.g., 
marriage, birth of children, education, and career structure) as well as milestones of the founding process in 
question. In a second step, these events served as anchors for the recall of our retrospective study variables. 
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This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received 
business assistance with regard to formalities concerning the venture set-up. 
Business plan 
This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received 
practical support for writing a business plan. 
Financing 
This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received 
business assistance with regard to financing the start-up. 
Strategic 
Market 
This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received 
business assistance with regard to a market and competitor analysis. 
Management 
This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder received 
business assistance with regard to management issues. 
 
Intensity 
This dummy variable indicates intensity of the interviewed founder’s take-up of 
business assistance along the founding process (in contrast to one-time 
assistance) – irrespective of the kind of support made use of. 
Table 3: Variables describing kind and intensity of public business assistance 
 
Table 4 sets out the definitions of all other variables and their descriptive statistics. 
  mean  sd 
Independent variables  
Previous self-
employment 
This dummy variable indicates whether the interviewed founder was self-
employed at any time before the first steps in the founding process.  
0.38  0.49 
Parents self-
employed 
This dummy variable captures whether the founder’s parents were self-
employed. 
0.17  0.38 
Social capital 
(strong)  Founders were asked whether they were encouraged by and received emotional 
support from either close friends and/or relatives (strong) or acquaintances 
(weak), which is denoted by 1 (0 otherwise). 
0.37  0.48 
Social capital 
(weak) 








We used the German 45-item questionnaire by Ostendorf (1990) to measure 
Big Five personality traits (extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, 
agreeable-ness, and neuroticism). Participants had to rate perceived personality 
attributes using 9 bipolar adjective pairs with Likert scales ranging from 0 to 5 
for each trait: 
Conscientiousness (α=.82), e.g., “Lazy vs. Diligent”  3.65  0.59 
Extraversion (α=.72), e.g., “Uncommunicative vs. Talkative”  3.21  0.61 






Openness (α=.59), e.g., “Conventional vs. Inventive”  3.18  0.55 
Neuroticism (α=.77), e.g., “Vulnerable vs. Robust”  1.37  0.50 
As noted earlier, we used Schmitt-Rodermund’s (2004, 2007) entrepreneurial 
reference type to estimate a person’s entrepreneurial personality profile. 
Following Obschonka et al. (in press) we estimated the “goodness of fit” of 
each person’s Big Five profile regarding this reference type (which scores 
highest (value of 5) in extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness, and 
lowest (value of 0) in agreeableness and neuroticism). First, we calculated each 
person’s squared differences between the reference  values and the personal 
values on each of the five scales. For instance, the squared difference for 
neuroticism is 9 when a person scored a 3 (because the reference value is 0). 
Second, the five squared differences were added up for each person and, third, 




 Higher values of this variable (meaning 
values closer to 0) describe a better fit between the individual’s Big Five 
personality profile and the defined reference type of an entrepreneurial 
personality. 
5.74 
                                                 
12 In contrast to all the retrospective data concerning the firm formation process (which refer to events up to 14 
years prior to the time of the interview), the Big Five traits are measured as respondents’ current traits. However, 
due to their high degree of stability, we deem these trait-measures as useful for the present study (Caspi et al., 
2005). 
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Team start-up 
Team start-ups  were  defined as ventures where more than one person was 
actively involved in the founding process and was intended to become an 
owner of the company. This dummy variable is coded 0 in the case of a single 
founder, and 1 in the case of a team start-up. 
0.68  0.47 
Novelty 
The novelty of the business idea refers to the degree of its newness. Five 
categories  were given: novelty (0), regional or local (1), supra-regional but 
national (2), European (3), and global novelty (4). 
1.31  1.57 
Current life 
satisfaction 
Founders’ current life satisfaction at the time of the interview was measured 
using a Likert scale from 1 (=lowest satisfaction) to 5 (=highest satisfaction) 
(“How satisfied are you with your life right now?”). 
4.02  0.73 
Year 1994–
1997 
Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e., the first business 
year of the company when accounting started either because of legal 
obligations or because of first revenue. 
0.40  0.49 
Year 1998–
2001  0.35  0.48 
Year 2002–
2006  0.24  0.43 
  Industry dummies:     
Nace 2  Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering  0.23  0.42 
Nace 3  Electrical engineering, fine mechanics, and optics  0.24  0.43 
Nace 7  Information and communication technology, R&D, services  0.36  0.48 
Nace x  Miscellaneous industries  0.18  0.38 
Dependent variables 
Usefulness 
Founders’ perceived usefulness of business assistance was measured for each 
kind of assistance used (e.g., assistance concerning formalities or financial 
assistance) using a 5-point Likert scale with 5 (1) denoting the highest (lowest) 
perceived usefulness of business assistance. The mean of these ratings reflects 
an overall subjective evaluation of actual business assistance. 
3.48  1.17 
Initial capital 
The start-up’s initial capital (i.e., at the beginning of the first business year) 
was asked for with the help of the following categories: 1,000 EUR or less (1), 
more than 1,000 to 10,000 EUR (2), more than 10,000 to 50,000 EUR (3), 
more than 50,000 to 100,000 EUR (4), more than 100,000 to 250,000 EUR (5), 
more than 250,000 to 500,000 EUR (6), more than 500,000 EUR (7). 
3.34  1.32 
Employment 
Employment  in the third business year was  defined as number of positions 
staffed by founders, active partners, conventional employees, hired labor, and 






We obtained a start-up’s  credit rating three years after founding from 
Creditreform, the leading rating agency in Germany. The variable credit rating 
thus contains Creditreform’s rating index, which ranges from 100 (best) to 600 
(worst). Creditreform uses several sources of information in making its ratings, 
for example, financial and structural risks such as industry, firm size, and 
productivity, as well as payment history, quantity of orders, firm development, 
and management quality.
13  The credit rating aims to proxy the start-up’s 
default risk and, indeed, credit rating and survival are highly correlated in the 
present sample (r: -0.20, p = 0.000). The credit rating thus serves as a 









Note. α refers to Cronbach’s alpha, which is an indicator of reliability 
Table 4: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
 
                                                 
13 For more information on Creditreform’s credit rating system, see Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007). 
14 Creditreform does not routinely generate credit ratings for each new start-up, but only when there is an 
external request from other firms. Because of missing credit ratings, we have to exclude 77 observations when 
analyzing the outcome variable Credit rating. These nonrated start-ups turn out to have significantly less initial 
capital and to be less often team start-ups than the rated start-ups. Hence, it should be borne in mind that the 
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4.2 Empirical clusters of policy take-up 
We investigate whether there are groups of founders who take up business assistance in a 
similar pattern regarding scope and intensity. Therefore, we perform an explorative cluster 
analysis to sort start-ups based on similarities in their take-up of policy support along the 
founding process (thereby employing all dummy variables set out in Table 3). Cluster analysis 
is a multivariate technique that sorts different objects into groups by maximizing within-group 
similarities and between-group differences. The identification of clusters is thus empirically 
based instead of guided by theory. 
We perform a cluster analysis using the “matching” similarity measure and employing 
Ward’s algorithm. The similarity measure “matching” displays values ranging from 0 (no 
concurrence) to 1 (complete concurrence) with regard to all dummy variables describing take-
up of business assistance (as given in Table 3). Having calculated the initial matrix of 
similarities between observations, the  hierarchical  Ward’s  method groups the original 
observations (stage by stage) in more aggregated groups in order to minimize the internal 
variance (within each group) and to maximize the intergroup variance  (StataCorp, 2003). 
Ward’s method has been shown to provide generally good results compared to other 
clustering methods (Milligan & Cooper, 1987). The results are presented in the dendrogram in 
Figure 1, which shows at which levels of similarity observations are grouped. Starting from 
the bottom with 194 observations, more and more observations are grouped together when 
lower levels of similarity are accepted (StataCorp, 2003). Figure 1 displays only the top 15 
branches of the dendrogram, since the lower levels of the tree become too crowded. A visual 
inspection of the dendrogram suggests two different groups of policy take-up. The 
observations within these two groups have at least a similarity level of -6.9. However, due to 
the properties of Ward’s linkage clustering algorithm the similarity values are no longer 
interpretable (StataCorp, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                                         
credit rating might imply a systematic bias in favor of the larger start-ups. Due to data availability there are also 
significantly fewer rated start-ups founded between 1994 and 1997. 
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Figure 1: Dendrogram using Ward’s method 
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on overall policy take-up and for each of the identified 
clusters. The clusters are compared using chi-square-tests which exhibit group differences in 
the take-up of assistance concerning formalities (Pearson’s Chi2(1)=2.98, p=0.084), business 
plan  (Pearson’s Chi2(1)=109.32, p=0.000), market analysis  (Pearson’s Chi2(1)=51.44, 
p=0.00), management  (Pearson’s Chi2(1)=54.72, p=0.000)  as well as the intensity of 
assistance (Pearson’s Chi2(1)=11.98, p=0.001). There are no significant differences in the 






plan  Financing  Market  Manage-





mean  0.742  0.367  0.461  0.207  0.218  0.428 
194 
sd  0.439  0.483  0.500  0.406  0.414  0.496 
 
Cluster 1 
mean  0.688  0.726  0.490  0.417  0.438  0.552 
96 
sd  0.466  0.448  0.503  0.496  0.499  0.500 
 
Cluster 2 
mean  0.796  0  0.433  0  0  0.306 
98 
sd  0.405  0  0.498  0  0  0.463 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics on take-up of business assistance—overall and separately for each cluster 
 
The pattern of policy support can be thus characterized as follows: 
Cluster 1. Intense assistance across all areas. 
Cluster 2. Less intensive assistance in operational issues (formalities and financing). 
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Apart from assistance concerning formalities significant chi-square tests indicate that the 
intensity of assistance is positively  related to all  other  areas of business assistance. 
Unfortunately,  we lack data about the intensity of assistance in each area separately. 
However, preliminary cluster analyses without Intensity result in a 4-cluster-solution, whose 
clusters differ significantly in intensities.
15
Self-reported reasons for non-take-up confirm our conjecture of strong self-selection 
into these clusters of policy take-up: “no interest/need” is the overwhelming reason for non-
take-up of business assistance, given in 70.5% of the non-take-up cases.
 We consider this as a favorable robustness check 
for the cluster analysis at hand, so that the later analyses base on the clustering partition which 
includes the variable Intensity. 
16
 
 In 18.8% of non-
take-up cases, business assistance schemes were “not available/known” to founders. Reasons 
related to policy-induced selectivity play virtually no role. 
4.3 Predictors of policy take-up and perceived usefulness 
Having identified empirical clusters of policy take-up, we now analyze which characteristics 
of founders and their start-ups explain the use of business assistance in general as well as 
separately for each particular pattern of business assistance, that is, for Cluster 1 and Cluster 
2. We then examine the predictors of perceived usefulness, again first for business assistance 
in general and then for each cluster (Section 4.3.2). 
 
4.3.1 Policy take-up 
To predict the type of policy take-up, we employ logistic regression and multinomial logistic 
regression analysis estimating odds ratios (OR). This procedure allows estimating the sample-
specific likelihood of being in the assistance groups, instead of the nonassistance group, as a 
function of the independent variables. Significant ORs that are higher than 1 indicate a 
positive effect and significant ORs lower than 1 indicate a negative effect. Note that each 
regression is conducted in two steps (denoted by Roman numerals): the first step considers 
founders’  Entrepreneurial personality profile, the second step, as an additional analysis, 
considers the single Big Five traits instead of the profile. 
The independent variables are control variables (Year 1994–1997, Year 1998–2001), 
our hypothesized predictors, namely, variables tapping nascent founders’ human and social 
capital as well as personality, and, finally, variables referring to the type of start-up. The 
                                                 
15 The resulting 4 clusters cannot be further analyzed due to small sample sizes. 
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results are set forth in Table 6. The results from logistic regression analysis reveal that 
Previous self-employment is a relevant predictor of the overall assistance group (OR=0.48). 
Founders who had prior experience at the time they founded the venture in question are less 
likely to be in the overall assistance group than in the nonassistance group.  
The multinomial logistic regression analysis (which predicts use of assistance in 
Clusters 1 and 2) further reveals that Previous self-employment  and  Novelty  are relevant 
predictors of assistance for both clusters. Specifically, Previous self-employment predicts both 
clusters. Founders with prior experience are less likely to be in either cluster than in the 
nonassistance group. In contrast, the Novelty of the business idea solely predicts inclusion in 
Cluster 1. Founders who start a business based on a novelty are more likely to be in Cluster 1 
than in the nonassistance group.  
In sum, these findings provide some support for our expectations. Consistent with our 
“weakness hypothesis”, founders who had low personal entrepreneurial resources (i.e., no 
entrepreneurial experience at the time they began founding the venture in question) utilized 
public business assistance more often than those with some experience. However, all other 
variables tapping personal entrepreneurial resources appear to be irrelevant predictors. 
Regarding variables that cover the type of start-up, we find no evidence that being a team 
start-up rather than a sole founder has any effect on the take-up of business assistance. 
However, the variable might be insignificant because of two conflicting underlying 
mechanisms, which were discussed in Section 3.2. Unfortunately, we cannot empirically 
distinguish between team start-ups’ potentially lower need of business assistance and their 
higher need for legitimizing decision making, which would tend to increase take-up of 
business assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 The reasons for non-take-up were asked for each kind of business assistance separately. The percentages were 
calculated by adding the respective responses across the five subject matters. 
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  Logistic regressions    Multinominal regressions 





  Cluster 1 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance 
Cluster 2 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance 
Cluster 1 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance 
Cluster 2 – 
assistance vs. 
no assistance 










  Year 1994–1997 
0.42  ***  0.43  ***    0.31  ***  0.56  *  0.31  ***  0.57  * 
(0.25-0.72)  (0.25-0.74)  (0.16-0.61)  (0.29-1.07)  (0.15-0.61)  (0.30-1.11) 
Year 1998–2001 
0.72    0.73      0.70    0.74    0.69    0.78   




























0.48  ***  0.48  ***    0.42  ***  0.54  **  0.41  ***  0.54  ** 
(0.31-0.73)  (0.31-0.73)  (0.24-0.73)  (0.32-0.92)  (0.23-0.73)  (0.32-0.92) 
Parents self-
employed 
0.81    0.82      0.87    0.77    0.89    0.75   
(0.47-1.40)  (0.47-1.41)  (0.43-1.76)  (0.39-1.51)  (0.43-1.82)  (0.38-1.50) 
Social capital 
(weak ties) 
1.31    1.32      1.55    1.14    1.61    1.14   
(0.83-2.06)  (0.84-2.08)  (0.88-2.74)  (0.65-1.99)  (0.91-2.86)  (0.65-1.99) 
Social capital 
(strong ties) 
1.12    1.12      1.04    1.19    1.03    1.17   






















    0.85              0.74    0.93   
  (0.58-1.24)      (0.45-1.21)  (0.59-1.48) 
Extraversion 
    1.00              0.88    1.12   
  (0.69-1.44)      (0.55-1.42)  (0.72-1.75) 
Agreeableness 
    1.05              0.91    1.21   
  (0.73-1.52)      (0.56-1.45)  (0.77-1.91) 
Openness 
    1.07              1.16    1.00   
  (0.71-1.60)      (0.69-1.93)  (0.61-1.64) 
Neuroticism 
    1.09              1.17    1.03   
  (0.69-1.72)      (0.64-2.14)  (0.60-1.79) 
Entr. personality 
profile 
0.99          0.98    0.99           



















1.08    1.07      1.31  ***  0.87    1.30  ***  0.86   
(0.95-1.23)  (0.94-1.22)  (1.12-1.54)  (0.73-1.03)  (1.11-1.52)  (0.72-1.03) 
Team start-up 
0.83    0.83      0.78    0.86    0.76    0.86   
(0.54-1.27)  (0.54-1.28)  (0.45-1.36)  (0.51-1.44)  (0.44-1.32)  (0.52-1.45) 
N  425  425    425  425 
LR chi2  29.21***  29.74***    52.65***  56.81*** 
Pseudo R2  0.050  0.051    0.063  0.145 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
OR = odd ratios (odds of belonging to Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) as compared to having no business assistance). 
95% confidence intervals are given within parentheses. 
Reference group in the multinomial logistic regression: No business assistance. 
Refusals for several variables reduce the number of observations to 425. 
Table 6: Logistic and multinomial logistic regression describing selection into business assistance in general and 
into particular clusters of business assistance 
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4.3.2 Perceived usefulness 
We now turn to investigating predictors of founders’ perceived usefulness of the business 
assistance utilized. In a preliminary analysis, we test whether this usefulness differs between 
the two clusters. It does: perceived usefulness is significantly higher in Cluster 1 (mean: 3.69, 
sd: 0.95) than in Cluster 2 (mean: 3.28, sd: 1.32).
17
In a next step, we conduct three single regression analyses (again via two steps 
denoted by Roman numerals) to examine the influence of founders’ human and social capital, 
their personality, and the type of the start-up on the perceived usefulness of their utilized 
business assistance. The first regression analysis refers to the overall sample, i.e., to all 
founders who made use of any kind of business assistance; the second refers to founders in 
Cluster 1; and the third to founders in Cluster 2. This procedure allows to explore effects 
within the overall sample as well as cluster-specific effects. Independent variables are control 
variables and the same set of predictors that were used to predict type of take-up (Section 
4.3.1). Note that we additionally consider founders’ Current life satisfaction as a control 
variable in order to adjust our results for a possible recall bias. As the dependent variable 
represents retrospective data, namely, founders’ current evaluations of business assistance 
they had utilized months or even years ago, this information could be biased by founders’ 
current state of mind, e.g., current life satisfaction (Rutter et al., 1998). 
 The lower perceived usefulness of less 
intensive assistance (as described by Cluster 2) might be partly explained by founders’ 
dissatisfaction about their first use of business assistance which will most likely result in no 
further take-up. 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the three regressions (overall sample and the 
subgroup analyses for Clusters 1 and 2). Founders’ Current life satisfaction  positively 
predicts usefulness in Cluster 1. Thus, those founders in Cluster 1 who felt happy with their 
current life perceived the utilized business assistance as more useful. Among the study 
variables, previous self-employment, self-employed parents, social capital (weak), and 
personality (an entrepreneurial personality profile and openness, respectively) are relevant 
predictors in at least one of the groups. Specifically, Previous self-employment negatively 
predicts usefulness in the overall sample; Parents’ self-employment, Social capital (weak), 
and an Entrepreneurial personality profile  negatively predict usefulness in Cluster 1.
18
                                                 
17 A two-sided t-test reveals significance at the 5 % level. 
 
18 Interestingly, we find that a lack of support from weak ties is correlated with higher perceived usefulness in 
Cluster 1, whereas a lack of support from strong ties seems to have no effect. This fits nicely to the social capital 
literature, which particularly emphasizes the importance of weak ties for entrepreneurship (Davidsson & Honig, 
2003). Founders' fairly remote but larger networks within the venture creation process may serve as bridges to 
various types of information and help, making more formal business assistance less useful (Granovetter, 1973). 
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Furthermore, Openness negatively predicts usefulness in the overall sample and in Cluster 1. 
Taken together, these results are in line with our expectations. Founders with low personal 
entrepreneurial resources perceived their utilized business assistance as more useful. This was 
particularly true within Cluster 1. Insignificant coefficients in the analysis of Cluster 2 
indicate that the usefulness of less intensive operational assistance does not depend on any of 
the personal entrepreneurial resources (apart from Previous self-employment) or the start-up 
characteristics we analyze. 
Interestingly, among the single broad personality traits studied, openness turned out to 
be relevant. Founders who lack creativity and openness to the new appear to have benefited 
from business assistance, particularly from intense assistance. As suggested by past research, 
higher levels of openness should be understood as a personal entrepreneurial resource (Zhao 
& Seibert, 2006). Openness could be a particularly valuable resource in the venture-founding 
process, which often demands high levels of creativity and openness to the new (Ardichvili et 
al., 2003). Moreover, as we already showed that founders who utilized business assistance 
were very often novice entrepreneurs without previous entrepreneurial experience, openness 
could have been particularly crucial for them, as they had to adapt to a new and complex 
occupational field—the entrepreneurial arena. While the novelty of the business idea has been 
shown to be a strong predictor of whether business assistance is taken up at all, insignificant 
coefficients indicate that start-ups’ innovativeness does not have an impact on the perceived 
usefulness of the assistance. 




in general   
Subgroup analysis for each cluster 
Overall (N=194)  Cluster 1 (N=96)  Cluster 2 (N=98) 
  (I)  (II)    (I)  (II)  (I)  (II) 
Cons. 
  2.70 ***  4.12 ***    1.99 ***  2.75 **  3.10  **  4.27 * 
Controls 
Current life satisfaction 
  0.19   0.16     0.40 ***  0.33 **  0.18    0.19  
Year 1994–1997 
  -0.02   -0.07     -0.28   -0.19   0.10    -0.14  
Year 1998–2001 





  -0.37 *  -0.38 *    -0.40   -0.38   -0.34    -0.42  
Parents self-employed 
  -0.08   -0.15     -0.47   -0.60 *  0.35    0.38  
Social capital (weak ties) 
  -0.07   -0.07     -0.53 **  -0.57 **  0.30    0.29  
Social capital (strong ties) 




     0.02        0.05       0.06  
Extraversion 
     0.09        0.13       0.17  
Agreeableness 
     -0.08        0.23       -0.27  
Openness 
     -0.30 *       -0.37 **      -0.33  
Neuroticism 
     -0.27        -0.06       -0.37  
Entr. personality profile 




  0.01   0.02     -0.02   0.01   -0.12    -0.12  
Team start-up 
  0.03   0.03     0.15   0.19   -0.17    -0.22  
           
R2 
  0.045  0.070    0.255  0.291  0.107  0.136 
Adjusted R2 
  -0.013  -0.010    0.155  0.150  -0.003  -0.021 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Table 7: Prediction of perceived usefulness of business assistance 
 
Additionally, we test for interaction effects between each (independent) study variable and 
belonging to either Cluster 1 or Cluster 2. In other words, we test cluster membership as a 
moderator (Baron & Kenny, 1986). This procedure allows examining whether the effect of 
each independent study variable significantly differs between the two clusters. Employing 
moderated multiple regression analysis (for continuous independent variables) and ANOVA 
(for dichotomous independent variables), we find two significant interaction effects (p<0.10). 
The effect of Novelty and Social capital (weak) on perceived usefulness differs significantly 
depending on being in Cluster 1 or Cluster 2.
19
 
 These significant interactions thus support our 
initial conjecture that distinct differences in policy take-up, as depicted by our two clusters, 
deserve separate attention. Finally, we should note that none of the predictors achieved 
significance in Cluster 2, which can be explained by the various reasons given for having had 
only less intensive assistance, again suggesting diverse predictors of perceived usefulness. 
                                                 
19 The analyses including interaction terms are not shown here but can be obtained from the authors. 
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4.4 Economic effects 
The previous section highlighted a person-focused view of actual take-up of business 
assistance and its perceived usefulness. From an economic perspective (and abstracting away 
from policy efforts to promote the economic status of disadvantaged groups), business 
assistance is mainly justified by positive external effects accruing from superior business 
performance and thus must be evaluated accordingly.
20 We approximate positive external 
effects by a start-up’s initial capital, its employment, and survival. First, business assistance 
might provide founders with the necessary commitments and signals to overcome alleged 
credit rationing (Blumberg & Letterie, 2008) and, therefore, business assistance might help 
founders to attract external finance. Initial firm size is consistently found to be associated with 
firm survival (Geroski, 1995; Sutton, 1997). Proxied by the amount of initial capital, it can 
thus be seen as an indicator for positive external effects. Cooper et al. (1994) argue that 
financial resources allow start-ups to pursue more capital-intensive strategies (which might be 
more efficient and better  protected from imitation) and to realize growth. Furthermore, 
financial resources constitute a buffer against random shocks. Start-ups with high 
endowments of financial capital are thus able to mount a greater challenge to incumbents and, 
in this way, will ensure efficiency and stimulate productivity (Fritsch, 2008). Second, 
business assistance should enable founders to manage and grow their enterprises. 
Employment growth is a prominent indicator of firm growth and prosperity and, moreover, 






Since the weaker founders seem more likely to make use of business assistance, the 
performance of assisted and nonassisted start-ups cannot be compared directly to identify the 
causal effect of business assistance. Therefore, the counterfactual outcome must be 
discovered, that is, the outcome of a nonassisted start-up if it took up business assistance. 
Nonparametric matching methods produce unbiased estimates of a treatment’s impact, 
for example, when estimating the effect of a particular policy intervention. The basic idea is to 
compare the mean outcome of assisted firms with those of nonassisted start-ups that are 
similar in terms of a predefined set of ex-ante variables but that have not taken up any 
business assistance. Given that the selection into business assistance is completely based on 
                                                 
20 As already discussed in footnote 1 a lack of recognition and asymmetric information are also put forward as a 
rationale for the public provision of business assistance (Storey, 2003). 
21 However, as already pointed out by footnote 7 positive external effects can also emanate from failed start-ups. 
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observable exogenous characteristics (i.e., not affected by the treatment), potential outcomes 
are independent of the treatment assignment (Smith & Todd, 2005). This assumption is 
known as the conditional independence assumption (CIA). Implicit in this matching approach 
is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which states that business assistance 
does not impact any start-ups other than those explicitly treated (Rubin, 1991). In the present 
context, this implies that business assistance does not impact nonassisted start-ups via market 
effects or knowledge spillovers. 
In  principle, one can match on all covariates. However, this may be difficult to 
implement when the set of covariates is large. To reduce the size of the matching problem, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose using propensity score matching. The basic idea is not 
to match on covariates directly, but to match on a function of the covariates that describes the 
propensity to take-up assistance. As actual propensity scores are not known, the first step in a 
propensity score analysis is to estimate the individual scores, which is usually done by logistic 
regression. 
In a second step, a matching algorithm must be chosen that contrasts the outcome of 
an assisted start-up with a weighted average of the outcome of (some) nonassisted 
observations. There are various matching algorithms that, asymptotically, should all yield the 
same results (Smith, 2000). In the present analysis, we apply kernel matching. This method 
matches every assisted start-up with the weighted average of all nonassisted start-ups. 
Thereby, the weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores 
of the assisted and nonassisted start-ups. When implementing kernel matching, a kernel 
function and a bandwidth parameter need to be chosen. The choice of the latter is of most 
importance in practice (DiNardo & Tobias, 2001) since the bandwidth parameter determines a 
tradeoff between a “few but good matches” (yielding higher variance) and “many but 
potentially bad matches” (leading to biased estimates). Here, Silverman’s (1986) rule of 
thumb is used to determine the bandwidth parameter and thus to balance bias and variance. 
The exact matching protocol is set out in Table 8. Estimations are made with the psmatch2 
Stata ado package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
Step 1. A logit model for all three outcome variables (initial capital, employment, and credit rating) is specified 
and estimated. In this way, the propensity scores for each observation are obtained. The choice of variables and 
the estimation of the propensity score are explained in Appendix B. 
Step 2. The sample is restricted to the region of common support. The common support condition ensures that 
any set of characteristics of assisted start-ups (as captured by the propensity score) can also be observed for 
nonassisted ones. A minimum-maximum comparison of the distribution of the propensity score determines the 
region of common support. Its imposition requires dropping 3 (8, 7) observations from the analysis of business 
assistance overall (Cluster 1, Cluster 2). 
Step 3. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the difference between the mean outcome of assisted 
start-ups and matched nonassisted start-ups. The average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) can be stated as 
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 N1 (N0) is the number of observations in the assisted group I1 (control group 
I0). The outcome of i is thus contrasted with a weighted average outcome of the control group. Weights are given 
by  , with  ik G   denoting a Gaussian kernel  ] / ) [( h P P G k i −   and Pi  (Pk) standing for the 
propensity score of assisted (nonassisted) start-ups. Silverman (1986) developed the following rule of thumb for 
the choice of the bandwidth parameter: h : 
2 . 0 9 . 0
− ⋅ ⋅ = n A h , in which n denotes the number of observations and 




deviation standard A =  accounts for the distribution of the propensity score. 
Step 4. The standard error of the matching estimators is calculated using bootstrapping (200 replications).
23
Step 5. The quality of the matching is assessed by analyzing the mean differences between nonassisted and 
assisted matched start-ups. After matching, there should be no significant differences regarding any 
characteristics that are assumed to have an impact on both the take-up of assistance and the respective outcome 
variable. Appendix C shows mean comparisons between assisted and nonassisted start-ups. 
 The 
estimates for the average treatment effect (ATT) as well as their bootstrapped standard errors and p-values are set 
out in Table 9. 
Step 6. Steps 1 to 5 are conducted for the following treatments: “business assistance in general” and, more 
specifically, the effectiveness of business assistance as characterized by Cluster 1 as well as by Cluster 2 is 
examined.  
Table 8: Matching protocol 
 
Results 
The matching results with respect to the four outcome variables for each sample (overall, 
Cluster 1, Cluster 2) are set out in Table 9. Looking first at the analysis of business assistance 
in general, we find that start-ups taking up business assistance have, on average, initial capital 
amounting to 3.28. Their matched nonassisted counterparts, however, have even higher initial 
capital (3.30). This difference is not significant. Similarly, employment in the first business 
year (third business year) of assisted start-ups exhibits an ATT of -0.97  (-1.69), i.e., the 
difference between the mean employment of assisted start-ups (5.10 in the first business year; 
8.19 in the third business year) and matched nonassisted start-ups (6.08 in the first business 
year; 9.88 in the third business year). Again, the higher employment of assisted start-ups is 
not significant. Looking at the indicator for survival, assisted start-ups have a mean credit 
rating of 287.66 compared to the mean rating of 285.56 for their nonassisted matched 
counterparts. However, the difference fails to reach significance. The same tendencies can be 
observed when we look at the effects of business assistance as characterized by cluster 1. 
Again, matching does not reveal any significant differences with respect to initial capital, 
employment, or credit rating. Business assistance as characterized by Cluster 2 does not 
                                                 
22 This notation follows Caliendo (2006). 
23  Although a distribution theory for the cross-sectional and difference-in-difference kernel and local linear 
matching is derived in Heckman et al. (1998), standard errors for matching estimators are in practice generated 
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significantly affect our outcome variables either. However, the amount of initial capital (the 
credit rating) is higher (better) for assisted start-ups compared to their nonassisted 
counterparts (insignificantly, though). The use of other bandwidth parameters and other 




Mean outcome of 
matched 


















Initial capital  3.28  3.30  -0.02  0.14  0.89  189  249 
Employment 1
st year  5.10  6.08  -0.97  0.61  0.16  188  249 
Employment 3
rd year  8.19  9.88  -1.69  1.04  0.11  186  239 






























  Initial capital  3.29  3.34  -0.05  0.19  0.80  93  239 
Employment 1
st year  4.96  6.07  -1.11  0.79  0.22  92  239 
Employment 3
rd year  8.16  10.01  -1.85  1.16  0.11  91  229 






























  Initial capital  3.36  3.35  0.02  0.17  0.93  97  238 
Employment 1
st year  5.30  5.98  -0.68  0.71  0.38  97  238 
Employment 3
rd year  8.35  9.91  -1.56  1.30  0.23  96  229 
Credit rating  279.94  281.34  -1.40  9.15  0.88  80  193 
Please note that no estimate reaches the 0.1 significance level. 
Table 9: Overview of results obtained from kernel matching employing optimal bandwidth parameters 
 
In sum, the matching procedure cannot reveal any impact of business assistance on 
venture performance (measured by initial capital, employment in the first and third business 
year, and credit rating  in the third business year) and thus cannot indicate any positive 
external effects created by business assistance schemes. Abstracting away from insignificant 
differences, the outcomes of matched assisted start-ups are most of the times inferior to those 
of matched nonassisted start-ups (in terms of having lower initial capital, lower employment, 
and a worse credit rating). This tendency either suggests that business assistance induces start-
ups to grow more slowly (leading to less employment after three years or to invest less 
capital). But, then, it also points to the conditional independence assumption, which might not 
be met in the present analysis. The validity of the conditional independence assumption relies 
crucially on the possibility of comparing assisted and nonassisted start-ups on the basis of a 
broad set of pre-treatment characteristics. We have a rich dataset and the matching succeeds 
                                                                                                                                                         
using bootstrap resampling methods. The use of bootstrapping is supported by Abadie and Imbens (2008), who 
suggest that the standard bootstrap can be applied to assess the variability of kernel matching estimators. 
24 These results are not shown here, but can be obtained from the authors. 
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in leveling out any differences with regard to, e.g., being an academic spin-off, the degree of 
novelty, previous self-employment, and social capital. However, there might be yet 
unobserved characteristics that explain the weak performance of assisted start-ups. 
Unfortunately, the very nature of the conditional independence assumption means that it 
cannot be tested. 
However, unobserved differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups would 
have to be very strong to be able to turn insignificant negative ATTs into significant positive 
ATTs. Therefore, we are confident in suggesting that business assistance does not impact on 
start-ups’ performance as measured by initial capital, employment, and credit rating. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this study we investigate perceived usefulness and economic effects of public business 
assistance in the founding process, utilizing unique data from Germany. Contrary to previous 
research that mostly considers business assistance as a binary treatment variable (e.g., Parker 
and Belghitar, 2006), we follow a cluster-based approach in public policy evaluation (Peck, 
2005) and focus on actual take-up of business assistance. Our analysis reveals distinct patterns 
in the use of business assistance—irrespective of particular schemes. In line with  earlier 
research on the take-up of business assistance (Hjalmarsson & Johansson, 2003; Barney et al., 
1996; Chrisman & Leslie, 1989), the patterns identified in this study can be described either 
as intensive strategically-oriented support (Cluster 1) or less intensive operational assistance 
(Cluster 2).  
Facing  a  lack of experimental design  and a lack of control variables in previous 
evaluation studies (Gu et al., 2008), and given their equivocal results (Davidsson, 2002), we 
employ propensity score matching to identify whether business assistance in the nascent 
phase translates into subsequent business performance. Our results suggest that business 
assistance neither impacts the amount of initial capital at the beginning of the first business 
year (as a more proximal outcome), nor employment or credit rating after three years (as a 
more distal outcome). Even for the more intense and strategically-oriented business assistance 
described by Cluster 1, which is taken up by founders of more innovative start-ups, we could 
not find any effect on subsequent business performance.
25
                                                 
25 The same is true when we abstract from our cluster partition and evaluate the effect of intensive assistance 
(compared to no assistance at all) and assistance which has been rated as above-average useful (compared to no 
 Starting up this type of venture can 
be expected to be the most difficult and at the same time the most socially desirable (yielding 
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positive external effects), which explains the increased policy focus on this type of start-up. 
Our analysis suggests that this policy interest has been successfully implemented, since 
innovative start-ups are more likely to make use of Cluster 1. Therefore, the lack of impact on 
our three outcome measures is unlikely to be explained by a bad person-treatment-fit, i.e. by 
the fact that business assistance was not used by the target group but by clients towards whom 
the assistance is not oriented. 
We should note, however, that our results do not indicate that every individual scheme 
is ineffective in improving clients' start-up performance. We rather find that the actual use of 
business assistance in the aggregate (as provided by various kinds of business assistance 
schemes) does not impact performance (as measured by well-established and comprehensive 
indicators such as start-ups' amount of initial capital, their employment, and credit rating). 
Furthermore,  against the backdrop that many  founders reported very useful assistance, 
concluding that business assistance (on average) is not helpful at all (has no impact at all), 
might be premature – at least from the founders’ perspective. This is also underscored by the 
fact that intensive strategically-oriented assistance (Cluster 1) is, on average, perceived as 
more useful compared to less intensive operational assistance (Cluster 2), which suggests a 
positive dose-response-relationship. We find that the weaker founders in Cluster 1 perceive 
business assistance as more useful. Entrepreneurial weakness was reflected by a lack of 
human and social capital, as well as by lack of an entrepreneurial personality make-up.  
Although self-reported usefulness of business assistance is a relatively weak 
evaluation criterion, self-reported usefulness of policy measures informs about policy delivery 
and the acceptance of the policy measure (Storey, 2000). Our results regarding perceived 
usefulness of business assistance might further indicate that business assistance is effective in 
helping weak founders to overcome barriers in the nascent phase, continue the firm formation 
process, and, finally, to become actual entrepreneurs. Although our non-parametric matching 
procedure corrects the selection bias between assisted and non-assisted start-ups and allows 
for heterogeneous treatment effects (Caliendo, 2006) further research with greater sample 
sizes should investigate treatment effects for particular subgroups. This also includes tracking 
nascent entrepreneurs along the founding process in order to adequately estimate the effect of 
business assistance on getting emerging ventures started.
26
                                                                                                                                                         
assistance at all). For both matching analyses we do not find any effect of business assistance either (the results 
are not depicted here, but can be obtained from the authors). 
 
26 Unfortunately, we cannot test for such a mechanism because we only have data on young entrepreneurs, i.e., 
those founders who finally succeeded in completing the nascent phase (survivor bias). 
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What are the political implications of our results? On the one hand, the positive 
evaluation of business assistance by weak founders themselves can be seen as policy success 
when publicly financed business is motivated by social policy or labor market policy which 
aim to help weak founders, e.g. the unemployed, to actually start a venture (Reynolds, 2007). 
On the other hand,  even if sociopolitical reasons for the public provision of business 
assistance prevail (i.e. efforts to promote the economic status of disadvantaged groups), the 
impact of business assistance should translate into economically viable ventures. This implies 
that business assistance must sustainably compensate for and develop entrepreneurial 
resources that are argued to impact entrepreneurial success at the micro level (e.g., 
Markman & Baron, 2003) as well as fostering structural change and economic growth at the 
macro level (e.g., Fritsch & Schroeter, 2009). Otherwise, the provision of business assistance 
runs the risk of enabling weak founders to continue in the firm formation process who are 
most likely to run marginal businesses. Therefore, it will be a fruitful approach to examine 
assistance schemes’ role in discouraging less promising start-up projects and thus allocating 
overall resources more efficiently. 
A closer look at the identified patterns reveals further insights for policymakers: On 
the one hand, the vast provision of less intensive operational assistance (Cluster 2) points to 
an excessive focus on operational assistance. In contrast to strategically-oriented assistance, 
less intensive operational assistance is unlikely to impact on long-run business performance 
(Mole et al., 2009).  Furthermore, operational services are hardly affected by ex-ante 
information asymmetries regarding the benefits of their use. Therefore, less intensive 
operational assistance could be most likely effectively and efficiently provided by, e.g., 
private consultants, accountants, or lawyers (Hjalmarsson und Johansson, 2003). On the other 
hand, the use of business assistance as characterized by Cluster 2 might also indicate poor 
policy delivery of strategic assistance. The generally lower perceived usefulness of assistance 
in Cluster 2 might be due to unsatisfied founders dropping out of assistance that was 
originally intended to be more strategically-oriented.  
Our analysis has several limitations. First, our cross-sectional analysis is mainly based 
on retrospective data. Although we adopted the well-established  Life History Calendar 
method to facilitate the recall process and to ensure the validity of our data (Belli et al., 2004; 
Caspi et al., 1996), longitudinal data and experimental designs are needed to strengthen causal 
inferences of business assistance. Second, small sample sizes and high standard errors provide 
good reasons to interpret the present results with some caution. At the same time, they should 
motivate future research which analyzes greater samples of entrepreneurial subgroups and in 
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this way might also overcome critique of the use of cluster analysis.
27
To conclude, we think that our findings should provide researchers and politicians 
ample opportunity for discussing the scope and intensity of public business assistance 
schemes, their expected effects and the justification of their public funding (e.g., between 
2007 and 2013, the European Social Fund provides € 45,000,000 on advice and coaching to 
support entrepreneurship in the federal German state of Thuringia alone (ESF, 2009)). Finally, 
we believe that our cluster-based  evaluation approach effectively tackled the bewildering 
range of ever-changing policy schemes. However, less fragmented business assistance 
schemes would clearly facilitate quantitative evaluations by providing a higher number of 
comparable cases. Our analysis thus points to the need to restructure the overall provision of 
business assistance and to consider means of evaluating it when designing and implementing 
policies, e.g., by realizing more experimental designs to strengthen causal inferences. 
Therefore, a stronger “evaluation spirit and culture” at all levels of policy design, 
implementation, and delivery is needed. 
 Third, our analysis 
lacks data about the use of nonsubsidized assistance, such as lawyers or nonsubsidized 
business consultants, who are most likely substitutes for publicly financed business assistance. 
Likewise, we did not examine business assistance in the start-up and post-start-up phase. We 
thus cannot generalize our results for these types of business assistance.  
 
Appendix 
                                                 
27 Peck (2005) notes that the clustering of policy take-up might be subject to criticism, since the results are 
relatively sensitive to the clustering algorithm and the similarity measure used.  
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A—Correlation table 
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3  Initial capital 
0.00  0.18** 
















































4  Employm. 1
st 
year  -0.01  0.11  0.31*** 














































5  Employm. 3
rd 
year  -0.04  0.07  0.28***  0.69*** 












































6  Rating 
0.03  -0.14*  0.02  -0.04  -0.13** 










































7  Academic spin-
off  0.15***  -0.01  0.04  -0.03  0.10**  0.06 








































8  Novelty 
0.05  0.03  0.11**  -0.02  -0.01  0.11**  0.31*** 






































9  Previous self-
employment 
-
0.18***  -0.11  0.06  -0.01  -0.07  0.10*  -0.06  0.09* 




































10  Self-employed 
parents  -0.06  -0.04  0.02  0.14***  0.12**  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.12** 


































11  Social capital 
(weak ties)  0.09*  -0.03  0.05  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.02  0.01  -0.11**  -0.07 
































12  Social capital 
(strong ties)  0.07  0.04  -0.03  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.04  -0.08  -0.03  0.25*** 






























13  Team start-up 
-0.02  -0.02  0.09*  0.15***  0.13***  0.00  0.20***  0.07  0.03   0.02  0.01  0.08 





























ness  -0.03  0.06  0.04  0.09*  0.04  -0.02  -0.08*  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.00 


























15  Extraversion 
-0.02  0.06  -0.03  0.06  0.08*  -0.08  -0.05  0.03  0.05  0.05  -0.04  0.03  -0.01  0.19*** 
























16  Agreeableness 
 0.04  0.01  -0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.07  0.09*  -0.04  -0.03  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.04  0.16***  0.05 






















17  Openness 
 0.04  -0.10  0.01  -0.06  -0.05  0.01  0.04  0.14***  0.01  -0.04  0.02  -0.02  0.02  0.12**  0.31***  0.04 




















18  Neuroticism 
 0.01  -0.12*  0.01  -0.06  -0.13***  0.12**  0.00  -0.03  0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02  0.06  -0.29***  -0.31***  -0.16***  -0.25*** 




















profile  -0.05  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.06  -0.02  -0.08*  0.10**  0.01  -0.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.04  0.37***  0.60***  -0.48***  0.54***  -0.43*** 
















20  Current life 
satisfaction  -0.01  0.18**  0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.18***  0.05  0.09*  0.03  0.07  -0.04  0.03  0.01  0.20***  0.16***  0.05  0.07  -0.23***  0.16*** 














21  Year 1994–
1997 
-
0.15***  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.16***  -0.13***  -0.09*  -0.10**  0.06  -0.04  -0.06  -0.03  0.05  0.07  -0.04  -0.08*  0.03  0.05  0.03 












22  Year 1998–
2001   0.03  0.03  -0.01  0.06  0.04  -0.02  0.12***  -0.03  0.06  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.09*  -0.11**  0.00  -0.05  -0.03  -0.12**  -0.04  -0.61*** 










23  Year 2002–
2006   0.13***  -0.01  0.05  -0.02  0.00  0.19***  0.01  0.14***  0.05  -0.04  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.15***  0.00  0.07  0.00  -0.47***  -0.42*** 








24  Nace 2 
-0.04  -0.06  0.16***  0.15***  0.24***  -0.12**  -0.12**  0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.01  -0.03  -0.05  0.08  0.04  0.04  -0.13***  0.01  -0.04  0.01  0.06  -0.03  -0.03 






25  Nace 3 
 0.01  0.03  0.11**  0.08*   0.06  -0.02  0.14***  0.23***  -0.04  -0.05  0.08  -0.01  0.07  0.02  -0.08  -0.09**  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.09*  -0.05  -0.05  -0.30*** 




26  Nace 7 
 0.06  0.04  -0.17*** 
-
0.13***  -0.17***  0.13**  0.09*  -0.05  0.03  0.00  -0.01  0.04  0.01  -0.13***  0.01  0.00  0.12**  -0.02  0.01  0.03  -0.15***  0.07  0.09*  -0.41***  -0.42*** 
-  -0.35*** 
-0.34*** 
27  Nace x 
-0.04  -0.03  -0.08*  -0.09*  -0.11**  0.00  -0.15*** 
-
0.21***  0.02  0.02  -0.09*  0.00  -0.03  0.06  0.03  0.06  -0.01  -0.03  0.03  -0.07  0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.25***  -0.26***  -0.35** 
- 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
The correlations with the variable Usefulness include only those 194 (96, 98) observations that took up business assistance in the overall sample (Cluster 1, Cluster 2).  
Table A1: Correlation matrices 
The correlation matrix for the overall sample (N=425) is depicted in the lower triangle on the left. The correlation matrices for the Cluster 1 and the Cluster 2 sample are provided in the upper triangle on the right. The upper 
coefficient describes the Cluster 1 sample (i.e., all nonassisted and all Cluster 1 observations; N=347), the lower coefficient the Cluster 2 sample (i.e., all nonassisted and all Cluster 2 observations; N=349). There are 
pairwise deletions because of refusals for several variables. 
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B—Variable choice and estimation of the propensity score 
A propensity score model must be estimated for  each outcome variable, including those 
variables that influence both the take-up of assistance as well as the respective outcome 
variable. These variables can be expected to account for the selection bias (Caliendo, 2006). 
To identify these variables, we look for variables that correlate with the take-up of business 
assistance and simultaneously with the respective success measure (initial capital, 
employment growth, and credit rating). Moreover, we conduct multivariate analyses to 
identify other distinguishing characteristics between assisted and nonassisted start-ups that 
have an impact at the same time on initial capital, employment growth, and credit rating, 
respectively. In the following, the variable choice for the propensity score of each sample is 
explained. 
Overall. Table A1 shows that the variables Previous self-employment and the time 
dummies correlate both with the take-up of business assistance in general and our outcome 
variable Credit rating. Similarly, being an Academic spin-off correlates with both take-up of 
business assistance and Employment. Since the time dummies are a significant predictor of 
policy take-up and the industry dummies are correlated with most outcome variables, we 
include these dummies as balancing variables.
28
Cluster 1. The variables Academic spin-off, Previous self-employment, Novelty, Nace 
2, and Nace 7 are correlated with both the take-up of Cluster 1 business assistance as well as 
various outcome variables (Table A2). Similar to the analysis of overall assistance, the Big 
Five trait Neuroticism correlates significantly with Employment and Credit rating. Again, the 
year dummies correlate strongly with the take-up of business assistance (as described by 
Cluster 1) and the industry dummies correlate with most outcomes. Since ordinary least 
squares regressions cannot identify other joint predictors of the take-up of business assistance 
characterized by Cluster 1 and our outcome variables  and following again the 
recommendation of Rubin and Thomas (1996, as explained in footnote 
 Similarly, we include the personality traits 
Extraversion and Neurocitism. Extraversion correlates positively, and the trait Neuroticism 
correlates negatively, with most outcome variables, which is in line with research on the 
personality-career success-link (Judge et al., 1999). Hence, we estimate the propensity score 
with the variables Academic spin-off, Previous self-employment, Extraversion, Neuroticism, 
and the year and industry dummies. 
28) the propensity 
                                                 
28 This approach follows Rubin and Thomas (1996, p. 253), who recommend including a variable in doubt 
“unless … it can be excluded because there is a consensus that it is unrelated to the outcome variables or not a 
proper covariate.” 
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score is finally estimated with the variables Novelty,  Academic spin-off,  Previous self-
employment, Extraversion, Neuroticism, the year and industry dummies. 
Cluster 2. Previous self-employment is the only variable that is correlated with the 
take-up of Cluster 2 business assistance (Table A3). However, similar to the correlations 
described above, the variables Novelty,  Academic spin-off,  Extraversion, and Neuroticism 
correlate with various outcomes and are thus included in the propensity score. Additionally, 
we have to balance Cluster 2 assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups on the basis of Social 
capital (weak) because preliminary matching procedures indicated that the matched samples 
will significantly differ in their weak social capital. Since ordinary least squares regression 
models cannot reveal any further characteristics which influence our outcome variables and 
that distinguish between assisted and nonassisted start-ups, the propensity score model is 
finally estimated with the variables Novelty, Academic spin-off, Previous self-employment, 
Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Social capital (weak), as well as with the year and industry 
dummies. 
The propensity to take-up business assistance is estimated with a logit model (Table 
B1). In accordance with the discussion above, the selected variables are regressed on either 
the take-up of business assistance in general, Cluster 1 business assistance, or Cluster 2 
business assistance. Since we are primarily interested in prediction and data reduction, 
redundancy and collinearity are of little account (Smith, 1997). However, this limits the 
interpretation of the coefficients, which are not further discussed here. 
 
Overall    Cluster 1 business 
assistance 
  Cluster 2 business 
assistance 
            Academic spin-off  0.7600   **    1.1654  ***    0.0439   
Novelty        0.1499  *    -0.1688  * 
Previous self-employment  -0.8270   ***    -0.8779  ***    -0.7157  *** 
Social capital (weak ties)              0.1878   
Extraversion  0.0109      0.0036      0.0673   
Neuroticism  0.1117      0.3281      0.0034   
Year 1994–1997  -0.9093   ***    -1.2090  ***    -0.7447  ** 
Year 1998–2001  -0.4200      -0.5573  *    -0.4186   
Nace 2  -0.0051      -0.5698      0.2807   
Nace 3  0.0844      -0.1331      0.0674   
Nace 7  0.1703      0.1698      0.1041   
Constant  0.1859      -0.8186      -0.4240   
             
N  441    340    342 
LR chi2 (k)  (9) 35.64    (10) 51.62    (11) 16.63 
Prob > LR  0.0000    0.0000    0.1192 
Pseudo R2  0.0591    0.1294    0.0408 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
Table B1: Estimation of the propensity score 
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C—Imposition of the common support 
The common support condition ensures that any set of characteristics of assisted founders and 
their start-ups (which is captured by the propensity score) can be also observed for 
nonassisted ones. The kernel density functions (Figure C1) illustrate the distribution of the 
propensity score for assisted and nonassisted observations—overall and separately for each 
cluster-specific analysis. The region of common support lies within the overlap (highlighted 
by the black boxes). The condition of common support requires discarding 3  (8, 7) 































Note: Observations inside the region of common support lie within the black box. All observations outside the 
box are excluded from the matching procedure. 
Figure C1: Distribution of the propensity score for the analysis of business assistance overall, Cluster 1 business 
assistance, and Cluster 2 business assistance 
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D—Matching quality 
T-tests for equality of means in the assisted and nonassisted start-ups indicate the balancing of 
the variables before and after matching (Tables D1a–D1c). After matching, assisted and 
nonassisted start-ups differ only with respect to strong social capital in the analysis of 
business assistance in general (Overall take-up, Table D1a). This should not be of concern 
since there is no evidence that this variable impacts on our outcome variables. 
Overall take-up of business assistance 
 
  Before matching 
  Initial capital    Employm. 1
st year    Employm. 3
rd year    Credit rating 
After matching  After matching  After matching  After matching 
Mean of…  Mean of 
matched… 
Mean of 




















































N = 194    N = 251    N = 
189    N = 249    N=188    N=249  N = 186    N = 239  N = 161    N = 202 
Academic 
spin-off 










0.17    0.17 
 
0.18    0.17 
Novelty  1.38    1.25    1.41    1.36    1.42    1.36    1.42    1.34    1.51    1.40 
Previous self-
employment 










0.26    0.28 
 
0.27    0.27 
Parents self-
employed 










0.13    0.17 
 
0.13    0.17 
Social capital 
(weak ties) 










0.34    0.28 
 
0.35    0.28 
Social capital 
(strong ties) 










0.41    0.31 
 
0.42    0.31 
Team start-up  0.66    0.69    0.67    0.72    0.67    0.72    0.67    0.72    0.68    0.74 
Conscientious
ness 










3.61    3.67 
 
3.58    3.65 
Extraversion  3.19    3.22    3.19    3.22    3.18    3.22    3.18    3.21    3.20    3.23 
Agreeableness  3.11    3.07    3.10    3.10    3.10    3.10    3.10    3.10    3.11    3.07 
Openness  3.20    3.16    3.20    3.20    3.20    3.20    3.20    3.19    3.22    3.20 
Neuroticism  1.38    1.37    1.40    1.36    1.40    1.36    1.40    1.36    1.40    1.37 
Entr. pers. 
profile 










-21.81    -21.10 
 
-21.73    -20.91 
Year 1994–97  0.32    0.47    0.31    0.35    0.31    0.35    0.32    0.35    0.29    0.32 
Year 1998–01  0.37    0.34    0.38    0.37    0.38    0.37    0.38    0.37    0.36    0.35 
Year 2002–06  0.31    0.20    0.31    0.29    0.31    0.29    0.30    0.29    0.35    0.33 
Nace 2  0.21    0.24    0.20    0.21    0.20    0.21    0.20    0.21    0.20    0.22 
Nace 3  0.24    0.24    0.25    0.28    0.25    0.28    0.25    0.28    0.27    0.30 
Nace 7  0.39    0.33    0.39    0.36    0.39    0.36    0.38    0.36    0.39    0.34 
Nace x  0.16    0.19    0.16    0.14    0.16    0.14    0.16    0.15    0.14    0.14 
 
 
                                      Propensity score  0.48    0.40    0.48    0.47    0.48    0.47    0.48    0.47    0.49    0.48 
 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers indicate 
significant different means between observation from assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching in a 
two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see Appendix C) and missing 
values for each outcome variable, the matched samples have fewer observations. Furthermore, each t-test might lack 
observations because of refusals for several variables. 
Table D1a: Group differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching 
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Take-up of Cluster 1 business assistance 
 
  Before matching 
  Initial capital    Employm. 1
st year    Employm. 3
rd year    Credit rating 
After matching  After matching  After matching  After matching 
Mean of…  Mean of 
matched… 
Mean of 




















































N=96    N=251    N=93    N=239    N=92    N=239  N = 91    N = 229  N = 82    N = 192 
Academic 
spin-off 
0.27    0.07 
 
0.27    0.25 
 
0.27    0.25 
 
0.27    0.25 
 
0.28    0.25 
Novelty  1.86    1.25    1.90    1.88    1.92    1.89    1.92    1.86    2.01    1.97 
Previous self-
employment 
0.27    0.45 
 
0.28    0.31 
 
0.27    0.31 
 
0.26    0.30 
 
0.29    0.31 
Parents self-
employed 
0.15    0.19 
 
0.15    0.16 
 
0.14    0.16 
 
0.13    0.15 
 
0.16    0.14 
Social capital 
(weak ties) 
0.36    0.24 
 
0.36    0.29 
 
0.37    0.29 
 
0.37    0.30 
 
0.36    0.29 
Social capital 
(strong ties) 
0.38    0.34 
 
0.40    0.33 
 
0.40    0.33 
 
0.40    0.32 
 
0.39    0.31 
Team start-up  0.68    0.69    0.68    0.75    0.68    0.76    0.68    0.75    0.68    0.78 
Conscientious
ness 
3.56    3.67 
 
3.56    3.64 
 
3.56    3.64 
 
3.55    3.64 
 
3.54    3.64 
Extraversion  3.15    3.22    3.16    3.19    3.15    3.19    3.16    3.18    3.17    3.22 
Agreeableness  3.08    3.07    3.07    3.08    3.07    3.08    3.06    3.09    3.07    3.06 
Openness  3.25    3.16    3.24    3.23    3.25    3.23    3.25    3.22    3.28    3.23 
Neuroticism  1.40    1.37    1.40    1.39    1.40    1.39    1.41    1.38    1.39    1.36 
Entr. pers. 
profile 
-21.92    -21.04 
 
-21.83    -21.21 
 
-21.86    -21.20 
 
-21.86    -21.25 
 
-21.62    -20.88 
Year 1994–97  0.25    0.47    0.25    0.27    0.25    0.27    0.25    0.27    0.21    0.23 
Year 1998–01  0.40    0.34    0.40    0.40    0.40    0.40    0.41    0.40    0.40    0.40 
Year 2002–06  0.35    0.20    0.35    0.33    0.35    0.33    0.34    0.33    0.39    0.36 
Nace 2  0.13    0.24    0.13    0.13    0.13    0.13    0.13    0.13    0.13    0.14 
Nace 3  0.29    0.24    0.29    0.28    0.29    0.28    0.30    0.28    0.30    0.30 
Nace 7  0.44    0.33    0.44    0.46    0.43    0.46    0.43    0.46    0.43    0.44 
Nace x  0.15    0.19    0.14    0.13    0.14    0.13    0.14    0.13    0.13    0.12 
 
                                        Propensity score  0.38    0.23    0.38    0.37    0.39    0.37    0.39    0.37    0.40    0.38 
 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers indicate 
significant different means between observation from assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching in a 
two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see Appendix C) and missing 
values for each outcome variable, the matched samples have fewer observations. Furthermore, each t-test might lack 
observations because of refusals for several variables. 
Table D1b: Group differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching 
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Take-up of Cluster 1 business assistance 
 
  Before matching 
  Initial capital    Employm. 1
st year    Employm. 3
rd year    Credit rating 
After matching  After matching  After matching  After matching 
Mean of…  Mean of 
matched… 
Mean of 




















































N = 98    N = 251    N = 97    N = 238    N=97    N=238  N = 96    N = 229  N = 80    N = 193 
Academic 
spin-off 
0.06    0.07 
 
0.06    0.07 
 
0.06    0.07 
 
0.06    0.07 
 
0.08    0.07 
Novelty  0.91    1.25    0.92    0.91    0.92    0.91    0.92    0.92    0.96    0.94 
Previous self-
employment 
0.29    0.45 
 
0.29    0.30 
 
0.29    0.30 
 
0.28    0.29 
 
0.28    0.28 
Parents self-
employed 
0.14    0.19 
 
0.14    0.20 
 
0.14    0.20 
 
0.14    0.18 
 
0.12    0.19 
Social capital 
(weak ties) 
0.30    0.24 
 
0.30    0.29 
 
0.30    0.29 
 
0.29    0.29 
 
0.33    0.30 
Social capital 
(strong ties) 
0.42    0.34 
 
0.41    0.34 
 
0.41    0.34 
 
0.41    0.33 
 
0.45    0.35 
Team start-up  0.65    0.69    0.65    0.69    0.65    0.69    0.65    0.68    0.66    0.71 
Conscientious
ness 
3.67    3.67 
 
3.67    3.67 
 
3.67    3.67 
 
3.68    3.66 
 
3.65    3.63 
Extraversion  3.23    3.22    3.23    3.24    3.23    3.24    3.22    3.23    3.26    3.24 
Agreeableness  3.14    3.07    3.14    3.07    3.14    3.07    3.15    3.07    3.16    3.03 
Openness  3.16    3.16    3.16    3.15    3.16    3.15    3.15    3.15    3.16    3.15 
Neuroticism  1.36    1.37    1.36    1.34    1.36    1.34    1.36    1.34    1.37    1.37 
Entr. pers. 
profile 
-21.59    -21.04 
 
-21.59    -20.95 
 
-21.59    -20.95 
 
-21.64    -20.95 
 
-21.69    -20.89 
Year 1994–97  0.39    0.47    0.38    0.38    0.38    0.38    0.39    0.38    0.38    0.36 
Year 1998–01  0.35    0.34    0.35    0.38    0.35    0.38    0.35    0.38    0.31    0.36 
Year 2002–06  0.27    0.20    0.27    0.24    0.27    0.24    0.26    0.24    0.31    0.28 
Nace 2  0.29    0.24    0.29    0.28    0.29    0.28    0.29    0.27    0.30    0.30 
Nace 3  0.19    0.24    0.20    0.21    0.20    0.21    0.20    0.22    0.21    0.22 
Nace 7  0.35    0.33    0.34    0.32    0.34    0.32    0.33    0.33    0.35    0.31 
Nace x  0.17    0.19    0.18    0.18    0.18    0.18    0.18    0.18    0.14    0.17 
 
                                        Propensity score  0.32    0.27    0.32    0.31    0.32    0.31    0.32    0.31    0.33    0.32 
 
Please note: The balancing of the variables is shown after kernel matching with the optimal bandwidth. Bold numbers indicate 
significant different means between observation from assisted start-ups and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching in a 
two-sided t-test (10% significance level). Because of the imposition of the common support (see Appendix C) and missing 
values for each outcome variable, the matched samples have fewer observations. Furthermore, each t-test might lack 
observations because of refusals for several variables. 
Table D1c: Group differences between assisted and nonassisted start-ups before and after matching 
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